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Abstract
In this paper we develop a simple equilibrium business-cycle model for an economy with both clean-
and dirty-producing plants. We derive that the optimal timing of cleaning the production process  is
during a slowdown of the economy. Due to external effects  and market failures the timing of pollution
abatement investments is not expected to be optimal in the real world. We test the optimality of the
timing of those investments with data for Germany, the Netherlands and the U.S.A. It appears that
for more than 25 percent of the sectors pollution abatement investments show counter-cyclical
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1. Introduction
Governments  are often  reluctant to attack environmental problems in recessions. They argue that they
have to wait untill the economy booms again, since then there is more “space”  for action. In this
paper, we argue that the best time  to clean the environment is when  the economy is slowing down,
since the opportunity costs of cleaning  the environment are lowest then. From the fifties  until the
beginning of the seventies, the conventional wisdom was that during recessions the economy should
be stimulated through an increase of govemment spending. The arguments used then, differ however
from ours. We believe that the govemment should concentrate the implementation of certain public
projects in recessions, but only those which are necessary for long-run growth, such  as investments in
infrastructure  and environment. Our motivation is not to dampen output fluctuations per se, but rather
to concentrate investment activities in times when  the opportunity costs of doing so are lowest.
There is some evidente  (sec  e.g. Bean,  1990 and Saint Paul, 1993),  that in recessions firms
engage  in activities that increase long run growth at the tost of a temporary fa11  in production. The
reason  for this is that the opportunity costs of those productivity increasing activities are lowest in
recessions. With pollution abatement investments, things are more complicated, since the main  reason
for fïrms  to undertake such  investments is because  they are forced  to do so by the govemment. So,
only when the govemment atmounces abatement laws early enough, firms wil1  have the possibility to
time  their investments optimally.
In this paper we wil1 first develop a simple model in.  which there are both clean and dirty
plants. In this model, the consumer workers derive positive utility from consumption and leisure and
negative utility from pollution. Dirty plants can  be made clean but this has costs in the form of
foregone production. Since most economies  are growing over time  it is necessary to continuously
implement cleaner production techniques to keep the absolute amount of pollution constant. We wil1
Capture this feature in our model by letting, in each  period, revert some clean plants into dirty ones.
We wil1  show that in this model it is socially optimal to increase pollution abatement expenditures in
periods when aggregate demand  is low.
Even when the govemment takes account of pollution extemalities by intemalizing them in the
prices or by setting emission standards the optimality result  wil1  only carry over to a decentralized
market economy when there are no market failures like for example capita1 rationing. Otherwise,
there is a potential role for govemments to subsidize  pollution abatement polities  in recessions. The
potential scope for govemment action, i.e. the importante  of possible market failures, can  only be
assessed  from an empirical investigation. We have therefore collected  data on pollution abatement
investments in different sectors for the U.S., Germany and the Netherlands. We look for a business-
cycle effect in the ratio of abatement investment to total investment. For 70 percent of the country-
sectors we do not fmd a cyclical pattem. A possible reason  for this might be that the timing of
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environmental regulation itself is non-optimal. Another reason could be that we have used sectoral
data rather than data on the firm level. In al1 but one of the sectors that do show a significant cyclical
pattem of pollution abatement investments we find  that, relative to total investment, those investments
are counter-cyclical.
2. Theory
2.1 Model
We consider 811 economy with two production technologies,  a clean-production technology  and a
dirty-production technology’.  At the beginuing  of period t, S, infinitely lived consumer-workers are
matched to clean-production sites, each  producing output Y,. So, there is only one (variable) input
factor in production. For simplicity, we distribute al1 workers over the unit interval. So, there are 1-S,
workers matched to dirty-production sites, producing output Y,, where Yo  > Y,  if there have to be
placed restrictions on the production technique to produce  cleaner and Y, < Y,  if clean plants
produce  the same output with less resources. Note that the problem does not become trivial in the
latter case in the sense  that al1 workers wil1  be matched to the clean-production sites (S, = l), because
such  a transfer wil1  not be costless due to operation costs.  Let u, be the fraction of clean-producing
sites that revert to dirty-producing sites within period t. This  can  for example be a consequente  of
depreciation. This process  captures  the idea  that a constantly growing economy needs  to continuously
clean up the production process  in order to keep the same absolute leve1 of pollution.
Let 0, be the fraction of workers who  move from dirty- to clean-production sites in period t.
Then the law of motion for state  variable S, is given by:
s,,,  = (1 - u,)S,  +  e,(l - S, +  u,S,) (1)
The first term in this equation gives the number of cleans  which remain clean and the second  term
gives the fraction of old dirties plus new dirties which become clean-production sites in the next
period. Finally, we wil1  assume  that there are operation costs  involved for a worker who  moves from
a dirty-production site  to a clean-production site.  These costs  are equal to one unit of time  input by
one (dirty-producing) worker. We can  give three  interpretations for these costs:
(1) The worker’s time  tost of moving from a closed  dirty plant to a new clean plant. According to
’ This model dmws on Davis  and Heltiwanger’s (1990) “prototype” model of job rrallocation
2
/ .
this interpretation, unemployment is a direct consequente  of cleaning the environment.
(2) An adjustment tost, in the form of foregone production caused  by the opening of a new (clean)
plant or the transformation of a dirty plant into a clean plant.
(3) An investment in human capita1 by the worker and site  owner. It may for example be necessary
to train the workers to work with the new cleaner technology. The costs of this investment are
foregone production, since when a worker is being trained he cannot produce.
Now, for a given u,,  there has to be made a decision about the fraction of workers at dirty-
production sites who wil1 be moved to clean-production sites, arriving at the beginning  of period t + 1.
To keep things tractable, we wil1  assume that it is always possible to transform dirty- into clean-
production sites. We can  interpret u, now not only as the rate  at which existing clean plants revert to
dirty ones,  but also  as the rate  at which clean-production techniques become available.
Let P, represent a pollution index in period t given by:
p, =  P(l-qN  - s,  +  qq  YD (2)
We assume for.simplicity that clean plants do not pollute. So P, is a function of the number of dirty-
production sites. Now, let the utility function of al1 consumer-workers in period t depend  on
consumption and pollution, and be given by: U(A$,,B,P,).  Where:
A,  and  B, are utility shifters. A change in A, wil1  be interpreted here as an  aggregate demand  shock.
B, is a taste for the environment shifter. Furthermore, A,, B, and a,  are assumed to follow first order
Markov processes.  We wil1 assume the following functional form for utility:
W,C,JW  = A,@C,) - B, AP,) (3)
Finally, it is assumed that consumers do not save. So aggregate consumption in period t is
equal  to aggregate production:
c, = (1 - u,)S,Y, +  (1 - s, +  qQ<  - e,v, (4)
Thus al1 income  from both clean- and dirty-production sites is consumed. The opportunity costs of
cleaning are in the form of foregone production and are represented by the term:
0,  (1 - s, + q4)  YD
At time  t, a worker chooses a contingency plan that maximizes life time  utility, given by:
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(5)
In what follows we wil1 concentrate  on the social plarmer’s solution to the problem. Without
govemment intervention there is no reason  for the market sector to arrive at this solution, since there
does not exist a market for pollution.
2.2 The social  planner’s problem
The social phumer’s  problem can  be formulated as a stochastic dynamic programming problem, with
Bellman’s functional equation given by:
V(&A,,B,u)  = max
ecP.11 [
AU[(l-u)SY, + (1 -S+us)(  1 -@YD] - B j(P)  + JE[  V(S,A,B,ü)I]
(6)
s.t. s  = (1 -u)S  + 8(1  -s+us>
where  overlined variables denote next period values.
For now, we are only interested in how the optimal policy function B(S,A,B,u)  reacts  to
innovations in A, B and u.  The fust order condition  of the maximization  problem of (6) is given by:
Af’&1 - u)SY, +  ( 1  - s)Y,]Y, - qpw  - s)y,1&J = J3E av(sáa;B9$  ,A,Jju1 (7)
Equation (7) te&  us  that under an  optimal cleaning  policy, the utility costs  of foregone output, minus
the utility gains from less  pollution are equal to the expected utility gains resulting from an  improved
future environment (as a consequente  of more clean-production sites) at the beginning of the next
period.
It wil1  be interesting to see how  the number of workers moving from a dirty- to a clean-
production site  responds to a change in the number of currently employed clean-site workers.
Therefore let US defme M, the number of workers who  move:
M,  = e,(l - S, + US,) (8)
thus :
% = -(l
as - uy3
Ske  g  = ( 1  - u)  - ( 1  - u)8,  w e  can  write
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The first part of the r.h.s. of (9) is similar to the consumption smoothing effect. The response to a
positive wealth  shock is not to consume everything at once  but to invest  part to increase future
consumption. So if S increases (i.e. Xlas  > 0, because for example a is low) output in that period
wil1 be  higher because less  reallocation has to take place. Part of this higher output will, however, be
used  to improve future environment by moving more workers to clean-production sites now. The
second  term of the right hand side  of (9), gives US the direct effect of S on M. For a given 8,  an
increase  in S wil1 reduce  the necessity to open more clean-production sites.
To get a better understanding of the relationship between  current consumption, current
pollution, future consumption and future pollution, we can  use (6) in combination with (7) to ge&
Equation (10) gives an  expression for the stochastic marginal rate  of transformation and tells US that
more present consumption wil1  be allocated to the future if:
(1) the expected rate at which cleans  become dirty ü is low.
(2) the expected ratio of output in clean and dirty plants  (YJY,) is high
(3) the disutility from current pollution (FBfp)  is high
2 . 3  Leisure
In this section  we wil1  extend the model by allowing for leisure and by allowing the production
function between  the two sectors to vary. Now, a consumer-worker either works in a clean plant, or
works in a dirty plant or is being reallocated. Workers employed in the different sectors and
‘werkers’  who are being  reallocated have different utility functions. Let these utility functions be
given by US(AC,BP,T  - a,) for those employed in the clean sector, UD(AC,BP,T  - aD)  for those
employed in the dirty sector and UR(AC,BP,T-arJ  for those being reallocated, where T denotes
common available time, as  denotes labour time  in the clean sectors, a, denotes labour time  in the
dirty-producing sectors and aR  denotes the time  it takes to be reallocated. So, it is assumed  that each
consumer-worker  has an  equal share in aggregate consumption. Let, for i=S,D,R, U’(AC,BP,T-aJ  be
given by:
* For a derivation, sec  appendix A.
U’(AC,BP,T-a,)  = AU’(c) + ‘D’(T-a,)  - Bj(P) (11)
Accordingly, we wil1 defme the production functions for the clean and dirty sector as g&a)
respectively g,(a) which give the output of working a hours in respectively the clean and the dirty
sector. When  working in the clean sector requires different skills than working in the dirty sector we
can  interpret the model as one where workers in different plants build up firm  specific  human capita1
and in which it is possible to move from the dirty to the clean sector at the expense of a period of
leaming during which period one cannot produce.
We wil1 now interpret the costs  of cleaning the environment in terms of foregone production,
due to the time  it takes for a worker to move from the dirty to the clean sector. We wil1  interpret 8,
as the probability for an individual dirty-producing worker to be moved to the clean sector, instead of
the fraction of workers that switches  from a dirty- to a clean-production technique. The problem now
is to fïnd a functional equation for the “representative consumer,” since we have explicit  diversity
across  fìrms  and households. We can  do this by weighting the utility functions for consumption and
leisure, over the different sectors. The weights are given by: (l-a)S,  the number of workers in the
clean sector, (1-S+uS)(l-8),  the number of workers in the dirty sector, and
(1-S + uS)CI,  the number of workers who  are being reallocated.
The social phumer’s  problem can  again be formulated as a dynamic programming problem with
Bellman’s functional equation now given by:
V(S,A,B,u) = max [  ( 1  -
s%e
cJ)&40@)  + US(T-a,)]  + (1 - s, +uS)(l-8)[AUD(C)  + 7F(T-a,)]
(13)
+ (1 -s+us)e[/lu*(c)  + oR(T-n,)]  - BJP)  + JE[V(S,A,B,ü)l  1
s.t.
c = (1 -u)Sg&z)  + (1 - s +us)(l  - %,(4
s = (h)s + e(l - s+dq
P = cr(l-e)(l - s + uS)g&N
In appendix B it wil1 be shown that the first order condition  with respect to 8 implies that:
[&%9  - m+N  + @wu,)  - m=qJ)  1 + &m4(1-~)~~~C)  +
(14)
(1 -e)(l  -s+dyY~c)  + C3(1  -S+us)uR~c)l  - g,(u)@&(P)  = JE
The first term between square brackets  at the left hand side  of (14) represents the change in current
utility, in terms of leisure, of being in the reallocation mode instead of working in the dirty sector.
The second  term on the left hand side  of (14) represents the marginal utility of consumption derived
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mfrom werking  u units of time  in the dirty sector, when  output is shared between workers in the clean
sector, werkers  in the dirty sector and workers being reallocated, while the third term represents the
disutility of marginal pollution. The latter two terms can  also  be interpreted as representing the utility
losses in terms of foregone output due to moving a worker plus the utility gains due to an  improved
environment caused by decreaaed  production. The right hand side  of (14) gives the expected utility
gains resulting from an  improved future allocation of labour. Thus equation (14) tells US that when  8
is chosen  optimally’,  the utility losses, caused by moving a werker  from the dirty to the clean sector,
(including the (temporary) environmental gains of this action,  caused by the fa11  in production), are
equal to the expected utility gains resulting from an  improved future environment.
(13) has the following implications for leisure4:
(1 -m&%w~, = v&,,
U-~+6w  -@g,‘@)AC  - qow&)  = qT+
(15)
(16)
Equations (15) and (16) tel1 US that, at an  optimal solution, the marginal utility of consumption
derived from working one additional hour in the clean or in the dirty sector should be equal to the
marginal utility of leisure in the corresponding sector.
A problem with the model above, is that one is either in one sector or in another or being
reallocated, while it would be more realistic that labour supply decisions would vary over the three
states. Townsend (1990) shows elegantly how one could do, this while maintaining the setup  of a
representative consumer.
2.4 Demand  and technology shocks
Demand  shocks
When  A falls, the utility of consumption decreases,  and it wil1  be optimal to transform more dirties
into cleans  (optimal 0 increases) and hence more workers wil1  be reallocated from dirty to clean
plants. More cleans  are opened because the marginal utility costs  of foregone production, given by the
1.h.s.  of (7), are lower when  aggregate demand, A is lower. An increase  in 0,  will, according to (8)
lead to an  increase in the number of movers, M, by (1-S+aS)  times the change in 8.
In the model with leisure the same arguments hold. Equation (14) shows that a fa11  in A
decreases  the opportunity costs  of cleaning the environment. But now we also  see from (15) and (16)
that there wil1 be substitution from both the clean and the dirty sector into leisure.
’ Our  assumptions are suffkient to ensure a* interior solution.
’ A derivation of (15) end (16) can be found in appendix B.
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Technology  and allocation  shocks
First, consider an  unexpected increase in a;  this is similar to a decrease of the number of clean sites,
S. If the innovation in o is considered  to be persistent, the marginal  rate  of transformation (from
future to current consumption) wil1 fall, sec  equation (10). As a result,  less current consumption wil1
be sacrificed for an  improved future environment.
An alternative form of an  allocative disturbance, is an  increase in the ratio Y,/Y,, for example
due to a new energy saving technology. This wil1  according to (10) lead  to substitution from current
consumption to reallocation activity resulting in higher future consumption and a cleaner environment.
3. Evidente
In environmental economics, thwry seems  to be ahead of empirics. While the implications of
environmental degradation, environmental policy and resource resttictions have been analysed in
many economie frameworks (e.g. growth, trade, public tïnance), there has been scarce attention for
the estimation of the effects  thwry predicts. The main  reason for this is of course not a lack of
interest, but a lack of data. While there is a growing attention for economie data on environmental
policy and its effects,  this has not yet materialized in intemationally available and reliable data.
In this section  we present the results of an  attempt  to test one of the outcomes of our thwretical
model. We look for a business-cycle effect in series of pollution abatement capita1 expenditures
(PACE) in industrial sectors of Germany’, the Netherlands and the USA. The series contain yearly
data and cover the period between  1971 and 1991. A short description of the data and their sources
can  be found in appendix C.
The effect of the business cycle on PACE might be obscured  when  abatement technology is
partly embedded in newly acquired capital. For this so-called inregruted  abatement technology, the
assumption made in the model that the adjustment tost of installing new abatement capita1 is lowest
during recessions, wil1  probably not hold. In order to immunize the effect of integrated technology,
and to concentrate  on end-of-pipe technology, we used (the logarithm of) the ratio of PACE to total
gross investment, rather than PACE itself, as the dependent variable. As a consequente,  the
hypothesis we test is not whether PACE is counter-cyclical, but whether it is more counter-cyclical
(less pro-cyclical) than total investment.
The business-cycle indicator is the detrended, real sectoral  output (in log’s). We detrended the
output series using a Hoderick-Prescott filter, with X -the ‘shadow price’ of non-linearity- set to 100.
’ Gcmny  is thc tenitory  of fomer  West-Genmny.
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The HP-filter is a means  by which a trend can  be estimated that minimizes residuals, subject to a
1inearity  constraim6
We tested for unit mots  in the series. For both the PACE-investment ratio series and the
detrended output series the nul1  hypothesis of a unit root could not be rejected in many cases. Hence,
in the regressions the first differente  of the (logarithm) of the series was used, which was indeed
stationary in al1 cases. The regression equation was estimated using OLS. The resulting coefficients  -
which can  be interpreted as the business-cycle elasticity of the PACE ratio - are presented in table 1.
It can  be seen from table 1 that for 5 out  of 30 estimations the business-cycle elasticity was
significant on the 5 percent level. For another 4 estimations it was significant on the 10 percent level.
Of these significant elasticities al1 but one have negative sign,  indicating a counter-cyclical pattem.
The results show important cross-country asymmetries. The evidente  suggests  that the German
PACE-investment ratios have the most manifest counter-cyclical pattem. For 40 percent of the
German sectors the results show a counter-cyclical effect, where for the Dutch and American
industrial sectors this figure is 20 percent. Moreover, for one Dutch sector (notably wood and wood
products) a positive elasticity was found, suggesting that PACE in this sector are more pro-cyclical
than total investment.
It is hard to detect a pattem in the sectors with significant coeftïcients. The only sector with
significant results for more than one country is electrical goods (383),  were for both the Netherlands
and the USA a significant elasticity was found. This could imply that the timing of abatement
investment is dominantly influenced by national factors,  such  ‘as  the method of regulation (ie taxes,
laws, covenants) or the compliance time-schedule imposed by the regulator.
For many sectors, especially basic  metal and metal products, the estimations did not yield
significant results. Therefore the outcome of our model is not unambiguously supported.  There can  be
many reasons  for this. Besides technical reasons,  like the disputable quality of the PACE series, an
important reason is possibly that the predicted  counter-cyclical nature  of environmental investments is
the result  of a model where  environmental policy is set by a ‘social  planner’. The observed pro-
cyclicality of PACE in the Dutch wood sector could therefore be explained by non-optimal timing of
the deadlines in environmental programs. If firms  have to comply with regulation within a period
where  no recession occurs, they are forced  to invest  on a non-optimal moment in time. There is one
other possible explanation that deserves  attention. This has to do with the fact  that we had to use
sectoral  rather than fìrm  data. It may wel1  be the case that at the fïrm  level, PACE increases after a
negative demand shock but that this does not carry over to sectoral  level. Especially when  fïrms  are
very heterogeneous and  are mainly hit by idiosyncratic shocks this sort of bias wil1  be severe (see also
Caballero, 1992 on this issue).
%ee King and Rebelo  (1993) for  a description of the  HP-fdter,  as wel1  as its pros and cons
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4. Conclusions
In this paper we showed that in a perfect working market economy,  where al1 external  effects  are
intemalized in the prices and which faces both demand  and technology shocks, the best time  to
undertake activities that improve the future environment at the tost of current output and consumption
is in recessions. The reason for this is that the opportunity cos&  of doing so are lowest then. A priori
there is no reason for this result  to carry over to the real world. First of al1 there is no price for a
clean environment, so the govemment should impose restrictions on the production process,  which is
indeed  already done in many  countries. But even when  a govemment is able to defme an optimal
leve1 of pollution and announces  it at the right time, there may  stil1 be many  market imperfections like
e.g. imperfect information and credit rationing, which prevent firms from timing their pollution
abatement investments optimally.
To get a better view of the relevante  of those market imperfections we have therefore collected
sectoral  data on pollution abatement investments for a number of countries. We fïnd  that in more than
25 percent of the sectors the pollution abatement investments-total investment ratio depends negatively
on the business cycle, while only in the Netherlands there is one sector in which this ratio moves pro-
cyclical. This result  suggests that there is a potential role for govemment intervention. This first
inquiry into the cycli4  behaviour of environmental investment raises as many questions as it
answers. Future empirical research should therefore focus on a better way to differentiate in the data
between integrated and end-of-pipe technology, and address  the question of how  the sectoral  and
country differences can  be explained. The latter topic would involve scrutinizing the environmental
policy in different sectors and countries, assessing its time  structure  and the nature  of the abatement
technology it triggers.
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Table 1. Estimates of the effect of the business cycle on the PACE-gross investment ratio, in the
manufacturing sector of the Netherlands, Germany and the USA.
ehtkity
Sector ISIC Netherlands Germany USA
food and tobacco 31 4.84 -3.83** -5.36
(1.17) (-1.90) (-1.10)
textile and leather 32 -3.01 -10.2* -.2.12
(-.2?0) (-7.01) (-.571)
wood and wood products 33 15.6** 2.38 -0.958
(1.75) (.769) (-,429)
paper products 34 4.80 -10.1* -7.09
(0.217) (-2.46) (1.16)
chemicals 35 -5.09* -2.90 -1.33
(-2.17) (-1.25) (-,790)
mineral products 36 6.03 -2.32 -4.58*
(1.67) (-,879) (-2.09)
basic metal 37 .1.04 1.03 1.19
(.220) (.487) (1.08)
metal products 381 3.50 1.85 -1.47
(.235) (.487) (-.843)
industrial machinery 382 21.23 -3.39** ,874
(1.39) (-1.84) (.400)
electrical goods 383 -14.3* 2.32 -4.93*+
(-2.04) (.456) (-1.89)
NOTES: t-statistics  between parenthesis. A single asterisk indicates  signifïcance at the 5 % level.  A double asterisk denotes
significante  at the 10% leve].
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Appendix A. Derivation of the stochastic marginal rate of transformation.
Off corners and under the optimal reallocation policy function, the value function, V, is differentiable
in S with’:
awd,B,u)
as =A(l  - ~PQcIv,  - (1 - w,>  + pw“m(1-4(~-e)y,
+J(l - u)(l  - @JE avw$vü)  ] A,B,u 1
where  overlined variables denote next period values.
Dividing the above equation by YD and substituting (7) into this equation  yields:
av
+ pBf,[P]  (1-a)(l-8)  + (1 -u)(l-@(Aû,Kl  - ~sf,[Pl)  = L l7
D
so,
av
A(l-u)&+  = 7Ll
D D
Hence,
Now, substituting (7) back gives:
which can  be rewritten as:
’ For a proof,  sec  Lucas and Stokey (1989),  ch 9.
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Appendix B. Derivation of equations  (14), (15) and (16).
Substitute  the constraints of (13) into the objective  function of (13). Note that:
ac- = -(l -S+uS)g,(a)ae
ap- = -/l(l  -S+uS)g,(a)ae
a n d
The first order condition for 8 is now given by:
- (l-a)SAUS&)  (1-S+uS)g,(n)
- (l-s+as)(l-e)AUD&l  (1-S+uS)g,(a)  - (l-S+uS)[AUD(cJ  + UV-a,)]
- (l-S+us)BAV&)  (l-S+uS)g,(a)  +  (l-S+uS)[AûR(c9  +  oR(T-a,)l
+  B&,(P)~(l-S+uS)g,(u)  +  JE g (l-s+us)  =  0[ 1
Rearranging  and dividing by (1-S +uS)  gives (14).
(15) and (16) can  be found by looking at the f.o.c. from (13) for a,  and a,. First note that:
dUS(AC,BP,T-as)
dus
= (1--4%,‘(4A~,  - ~s~~~o,,
a n d
dU D(AC,BP,  T-u,) D‘0
daD
= (1 -S+us)(l-8)g,‘(u)A~D,  - cT-a  ,
D
Now the first order condition with respect to a, gives:
(1 -M.(l  -%,l  W@,  - @cT-<131  = 0
which is equation  (15).
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The first order condition with respect to aD  gives:
(1 -S+as)(l-0)[&(1 -S+us)(l  -@g,‘(a)  - DDCT_aI ] - B&(P)p(l-8)(1  -S+uS)g,‘(a)  = 0
Hence,
(1 -S+uS)(  1 -e>g&+4ûD,  - qp(P)Pg,‘W  = ‘oD&q
whích is equation (16).
1 5
I, ,.., .,
Appendix C. Data and Sources
The data on gross PACE are taken from national sources, since no deliberate, international survey of
these data exist. Morwver, there are a mere  handful of commies  were PACE data of the private
sector are collected in a consistent marmer and over a longer period. The best data can  be found for
the Netherlands, Germany and the USA. Since these data are the result  of national surveys, they
cannot easily be compared. The dust has not yet settled on the discussion about the defmitions and
methodology that should ideally be used for abatement investment surveys. Recently, the EUROSTAT
tried to synchronize  the national bureaus of statistics  of the EU by suggesting a common methodology
by the name SERIEE, but it is unlikely that the German and Dutch survey wil1  be altered to comply
with these directions in the near future.
Apart from the disparities in deftitions,  cross-country comparison of the data is hindered by
the different systems that are used for the sectoral  breakdown. Each  country employs a different
categorisation. The German breakdown is based on the Systematik der Wirtschaftzweige,  Fassungfur
Umweltstatistiken  (SYUM), the Dutch CBS uses the Standaard Bedrijfs  Indeling (SBI), the American
Bureau of the Census based  the sectoral  breakdown on the Standard Industrial Classtjìcation  (SIC). In
order to facilitate cross-country comparison, we fïtted  the series in a common system of classifïcation:
the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC).*
The German series are from the Statistisches Bundesamt lnvestionen für Umweltschutz im
produzierende Gewerbe, and cover the period from 1975 til1 i991,  on a yearly base. The Dutch data
are from the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek Milieukosten van Bedrijven. The survey started in
1979, but estimations of PACE are available from 1971 til1 1990. The Bureau of the Census
publication Pollution Abatement Costs  and  Expenditures  is the source of the American PACE series.
The data range from 1973 til1 1991. For 1987 no data are available.
Output and investment data are from the OECD Sectoral  Database. Investment is gross tïxed
capita1 formation, output is real gross sectoral  production.
’ An account of this mapping  of classifìcations  can be found in Bouman (1995). which also contains  a more comprehensive
description of the data.
16
r
